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Influenza pandemics have occurred for
centuries, three times (1918, 1957, and 1968) in
the 20th century alone. Another pandemic is
highly likely, if not inevitable (1). In the 1918
influenza pandemic, more than 20 million people
died (2). Improvements in medical care and
technology since the last pandemic may reduce
the impact of the next. When planning for the
next pandemic, however, decision makers need
to examine the following questions: Would it
make economic sense to vaccinate the entire U.S.
population if 15% were to become clinically ill?
What if 25% were to become ill? To answer such
questions, we conducted economic analyses of
potential intervention scenarios.
Although many studies have examined or
reviewed the economics of influenza vaccination
(3-10), only one study (11), published in 1976,
examined the economics of a vaccine-based
intervention aimed at reducing the impact of an
influenza epidemic in the United States. Our
study examines the possible economic effects of
the next influenza pandemic in the United
States, analyzes these effects, and uses the
results to estimate the costs, benefits, and policy
implications of several possible vaccine-based
interventions. These estimates can be used in
developing national and state plans to respond to
an influenza pandemic.1 Unlike the 1976 study,
ours examined the effect of varying the values of
a number of key input variables. Specific
objectives were to provide a range of estimates
regarding the number of deaths, hospitaliza-
tions, outpatient visits, and those ill persons not
seeking medical care in the next influenza
pandemic; provide a cost estimate of health
outcomes; estimate the potential net value of
possible vaccination strategies;2 evaluate the
effect of using different criteria (e.g., death rates,
economic returns due to vaccination) to set
vaccination priorities; assess the economic
impact of administering various doses of vaccine
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We estimated the possible effects of the next influenza pandemic in the United
States and analyzed the economic impact of vaccine-based interventions. Using death
rates, hospitalization data, and outpatient visits, we estimated 89,000 to 207,000
deaths; 314,000 to 734,000 hospitalizations; 18 to 42 million outpatient visits; and 20 to
47 million additional illnesses. Patients at high risk (15% of the population) would
account for approximately 84% of all deaths. The estimated economic impact would be
US$71.3 to $166.5 billion, excluding disruptions to commerce and society. At $21 per
vaccinee, we project a net savings to society if persons in all age groups are vaccinated.
At $62 per vaccinee and at gross attack rates  of 25%, we project net losses if persons
not at high risk for complications are vaccinated. Vaccinating 60% of the population
would generate the highest economic returns but may not be possible within the time
required for vaccine effectiveness, especially if two doses of vaccine are required.
1A complete plan detailing a response to an influenza pandemic should include definition of a pandemic, points that will initiate
various steps in the response plan, and details about deploying the intervention. While a U.S. federal influenza pandemic plan
is being developed, a guide to aid state and territorial health officials in developing plans for their jurisdictions is available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/nvpo/pandemicflu.htm. Printed copies can be obtained from the author.
2We limited our examination of possible interventions to those involving influenza vaccines. We did not consider the use of
antiviral drugs for influenza prophylaxis because there may not be adequate supplies; first priority for such drugs may be for
treatment; and  the side-effects from the drugs, particularly amantadine, make them unsuitable for long-term prophylaxis for
many workers, such as drivers, or heavy construction operators.660 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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and of administering vaccine to different age
groups and groups at risk; and calculate an
insurance premium that could reasonably be
spent each year for planning, preparedness, and
practice.
Methods
The Model
Building a mathematical model of the spread
of influenza is difficult largely because of
differences in virus transmission and virulence,
lack of understanding of the primary factors
affecting the spread of influenza, and shortage of
population-based data (12). Because of the
difficulties in calculating realistic estimates of
the numbers of cases in the next influenza
pandemic, we used a Monte Carlo mathematical
simulation model (13-15), which uses predefined
probability distributions of key input variables to
calculate the number of illnesses and deaths that
could result from an influenza pandemic. Some
of the most important probability distributions
we used describe the population-based rates of
illness and death. These rates are based on
illness and death rates reported in earlier
influenza pandemics and epidemics. The model
produces a range of estimated effects rather than
a single point estimate. The model is not
epidemiologic and thus does not describe the
spread of the disease through a population.
Many details of the model are presented
below and in Appendix I; a more detailed
explanation and a complete list of all the
variables used and the values assigned to the
variables are available at Appendix II.
For interventions to contain and reduce the
impact of an influenza pandemic, we used a
societal perspective, which takes into account all
benefits and all costs regardless of who receives
and who pays.
Age Distribution and Persons at High Risk
Since the age distribution of patients in the
next pandemic is unknown, we assumed a
distribution (Table 1) among the three age
groups (0 to 19 years, 20 to 64 years, and 65 years
and older).3 Further, each age group was divided
into those at high risk (persons with a
preexisting medical condition making them more
susceptible to complications from influenza) and
those not at high risk (Table 1).4 Age by itself was
not considered a risk factor; persons 65 years and
older were assumed to have higher rates of
illness and death than the rest of the population
(Table 2).
3This article presents the results for one distribution of cases by age and risk group. The background paper in Appendix II,
however, contains additional results obtained by using a different distribution.
4The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices estimates that 27 to 31 million people ages <65 years are at high risk for
influenza-associated complications (17). ACIP also classifies all 32 million people >65 years as being at elevated risk for
influenza-related complications (17). Further, the working group on influenza pandemic preparedness and emergency response
has assumed that approximately 19 million household members of persons at high risk should also be vaccinated to reduce the
probability of transmission to those at high risk (GrIPPE, unpub. data, 1997).
Table 1. Estimate of age distribution of cases and
percentage of population at high risk used to examine
the impact of pandemic influenza in the United States
Age group (yrs)  Percentage of all casesa
  0-19   40.0
  20-64   53.1
  65 +     6.8
      Totalsb 100.0
Percentage at high riskc
  0-19   6.4
  20-64 14.4
  65 + 40.0
     U.S. averaged 15.4
aThe actual number of cases will depend upon the assumed
gross attack rate. The distribution of cases was based on
lower and upper estimates of age-specific attack rates from
the 1918, 1928-29, and 1957 epidemics and pandemics (19).
bTotals do not add to exactly 100% because of rounding.
cPersons are categorized at high risk if they have a
preexisting medical condition that makes them more
susceptible to influenza-related complications. The percent-
ages of age groups at high risk were obtained from the
Working Group on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and
Emergency Response (GrIPPE, unpub. data). The Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices estimates that 27 to 31
million persons aged  <65 years are at high risk for influenza-
associated complications (17).
dAverage is an age-weighted average, using each age groups
proportion of the total U.S. population.661 Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Gross Attack Rates
In the model, we used gross attack rates
(percentage of clinical influenza illness cases per
population) of 15% to 35%, in steps of 5%.
Infected persons who continued to work were not
considered to have a clinical case of influenza,
and were not included.
Illnesses and Deaths
The rates of adverse effects (outpatient
visits, hospitalizations, deaths, and illnesses for
which no medical care was sought), by age and
risk group, were used to determine the number
of persons in each category (Table 2) (Appendix
II).
Net Returns of Vaccinating against an
Influenza Pandemic
Vaccinating predefined segments of the
population will be one of the major strategies for
reducing the impact of pandemic influenza, and
the net return, in dollars, from vaccination is an
important economic measure of the costs and
benefits associated with vaccination. We calcu-
lated the net return by using the following
formula for each age and risk group:
The savings from illnesses and deaths averted
and the cost of vaccinations are described in
Appendix I. Some input variables are described
below and in Appendix II.
Input Variables
The direct medical costs (i.e., those
reimbursed by third-party payers such as health
insurance companies) associated with hospital-
izations, outpatient visits, and drug purchases
were obtained from a proprietary database
containing health insurance claims data from
approximately 4 million insured persons (The
MEDSTAT Group, Ann Arbor, MI) (Table 3).
Following the methods used by McBean et al.
(28), we extracted the data for outpatient visits
from the database with codes from the
International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision (ICD-9) for pneumonia and bronchitis
(ICD-9: 480-487.8), acute bronchitis (ICD-9: 466-
466.1), and chronic respiratory disease (ICD-9:
490-496). Costs for inpatient care were extracted
with the same codes, when recorded as the
principal diagnosis and when recorded as any of
the diagnoses in a patients chart. Further,
because influenza can cause patients with
preexisting medical conditions to seek inpatient
care, data were extracted for the inpatient costs
of treating heart-related conditions (common
preexisting conditions that place a person at high
Net              =        Savings from outcomes
returns averted in population
                  age,         age,
                 risk        risk
                 group        group
                - cost of vaccination of population
  age,
  risk
  group
Table 2. Variables used to define distributions of disease
outcomes of those with clinical casesa of influenza
         Rates per 1,000 personsb
Most
Variable         Lower likely Upper
Outpatient  visits
Not at high risk
0-19 yrs old 165 230
20-64 yrs old   40   85
65 + yrs old   45   74
High risk
0-19 yrs old 289 403
20-64 yrs old   70 149
65 + yrs old   79 130
Hospitalizations
Not at high risk
0-19 yrs old     0.2 0.5     2.9
20-64 yrs old     0.18     2.75
65 + yrs old     1.5     3.0
High risk
0-19 yrs old     2.1 2.9     9.0
20-64 yrs old     0.83     5.14
65 + yrs old     4.0   13
Deaths
Not at high risk
0-19 yrs old     0.014 0.024      0.125
20-64 yrs old     0.025 0.037      0.09
65 + yrs old     0.28 0.42      0.54
High risk
0-19 yrs old     0.126 0.22      7.65
20-64 yrs old     0.1      5.72
65 + yrs old     2.76      5.63
aClinical cases are defined as cases in persons with illness
sufficient to cause an economic impact. The number of
persons who will be ill but will not seek medical care, are
calculated as follows: Number illage = (Populationage x gross
attack rate) - (deathsage + hospitalizationsage + outpatientsage).
The number of deaths, hospitalizations, and outpatients are
calculated by using the rates presented in this table.
bFor Monte Carlo simulations, rates are presented as lower
and upper for uniform distributions, and lower, most likely,
and upper for triangular distributions (18).
 Sources: 3,6,11,19-29, and Appendix II.662 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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Table 3. Input variables used to calculate the economic impact (direct and indirect costs) of health outcomes due to an influenza
pandemic in the United States (in 1995 US$)
Outcome category Type of Age group (yrs)
item    cost     0-19      20-64      65+                 Sources
Deaths
Average age (years)        9        35         74 Assumed
PV earnings lost ($)a Indirect 1,016,101 1,037,673 65,837 16, 30
Most likely + min or max Direct 3,435+2,632 7,605+3,888 8,309+3,692 Marketscan Database; 31.
  hospital costs ($)b
Subtotal  ($)c 1,019,536 1,045,278 74,146
Hospitalizations
Most likely + min or max Direct 2,936+2,099 6,016+2,086 6,856+3,200 Marketscan Database; 31.
   hospital costs ($)b
Most likely + min or max Direct 74 + 40 94 + 70 102 + 60 Marketscan Database; 31.
   net pay for outpatient
  visits ($)d
Avg. copayment for Direct      5      4        4 Marketscan Database
  outpatients visit ($)
Most likely + min or max Direct 26 + 9 42 + 30   41 + 10 Marketscan Database
  net payment for drug
  claims($)e
Most likely + min or max Indirect 5 + 2.7 8 + 4.8 10 +5.4 Marketscan Database; 31.
  days lostf
Value 1 day lost ($)g Indirect   65 100 or 65   65 30
 Subtotal  ($)c 3,366 6,842 7,653
Outpatient visits
Avg. no. visitsh Direct 1.52 1.52 1.52 Marketscan Database
Most likely + min or max Direct 49 +13 38 + 12 50 + 16 Marketscan Database
  net payment per visit($)i
Avg. copayment for Direct     5     4      4 Marketscan Database
  outpatient visit ($)
Most likely + min or max Direct 25 + 18 36 + 27 36 + 22 Marketscan Database
   net payment per
  prescription($)j
Avg. prescriptions per visit Direct     0.9     1.8     1.4 Marketscan Database
Avg. copayment per Direct     3     3     3 Marketscan Database
   prescription ($)
Days lost Indirect     3     2     5 4,5
Value 1 day lost ($)g Indirect   65 100   65 30
 Subtotal  ($)c 300 330 458
Ill, no medical care sought
Days lost Indirect     3     2     5 4,5
Value 1 day lost ($)g Indirect   65 100   65 30
Over-the-counter drugs ($) Direct     2     2     2 Assumed
Subtotal  ($)c 197 202 327
aAverage present value (PV), using a 3% discount rate, of expected future lifetime earnings and housekeeping services, weighted by age and
gender (30) and adjusted to 1995 dollars (by multiplying by a factor of 1.07) (16).
bMost likely, with + defining the minimum and maximum costs for a triangular distribution (18) for Monte Carlo analysis (13-15). The values
were calculated by using cost data from Marketscan Database (The MEDSTAT Group, Ann Arbor, MI) and multiplying it by a hospital cost-to-
charge ratio of 0.53. The latter ratio is a weighted average of the urban and rural (urban = 0.80, rural = 0.20) cost-to-charge ratios calculated by
the Health Care Finance Administration for August 1996 (31).
cSubtotals are the totals for each category of outcome, using the most likely estimates.
dMost likely, with minimum and maximum values of net payments for outpatient visits up to 14 days before admission date and up to 30 days
after discharge date.
eNet payment for drug claims associated with outpatient visits up to 14 days before admission and up to 30 days after discharge.
fMost likely, with + defining the minimum and maximum days lost due to hospitalization for a triangular distribution (18) for Monte Carlo
analysis (13-15).  Calculated using length of stay in hospital data from Marketscan Database (The MEDSTAT Group, Ann Arbor, MI) and adding
a total of one additional day for convalescence and pre- and posthospitalization outpatient visits for 0-19 and 20-64 years of age. For 65 + years,
two additional days were added to length of stay in hospital for convalescence and pre- and posthospitalization outpatient visits.
gFor 0-19 and 65+ years age groups, a day lost to influenza was valued as equivalent to an unspecified day (30), denoting a value for time lost
by care givers and family members related to taking care of a patient in these age groups. For 20-64 years of age, 60% of days lost due to
hospitalizations and related convalescence and pre- and posthospitalization outpatient visits were valued as day off work ($100/day). The
remaining 40% of days lost were valued as unspecified days ($65/day). For 20-64 years of age, when patients were not hospitalized at any point
during their illness (i.e., outpatient status), all days lost were assumed days off work ($100/day).
hThe number of visits per episode of influenza is an average across all age groups. From the database, it was found that 85% of all patients had
less than three outpatient visits, with an average of 1.52 visits (Appendix II).
iMost likely, with minimum and maximum values of net payments for outpatient visits without any specified association to hospitalizations.
jMost likely, with + defining the minimum and maximum cost per prescription, with the number of prescriptions per visit.663 Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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risk for influenza-related illness or death).
Hospital costs attributed to pneumonia and
bronchitis, acute bronchitis, chronic respiratory
disease, and the identified heart conditions were
then estimated as weighted averages (Appendix
II).
The principal indirect cost was lost
productivity, which was valued by using an age-
and gender-weighted average wage (Table 3)
(30). The economic cost of a death was valued at
the present net value of the average expected
future lifetime earnings, weighted for gender
and age (30). All costs were standardized to 1995
US$ values.
The cost of fully vaccinating a person (i.e.,
administering the number of doses necessary to
protect against disease) was modeled with two
assumed values, approximately $21 and $62 per
person fully vaccinated (Table 4). These costs
include the cost of the vaccine, as well as its
distribution and administration (health-care
worker time, supplies); patient travel; time lost
from work and other activities; and cost of side
effects (including Guillain-Barré syndrome)
(Table 4) (Appendix II).
Vaccine Effectiveness
The assumed levels of vaccine effectiveness
used to estimate the savings gained due to a
vaccine-based intervention are described in
Appendix I; the equation defining savings from
outcomes averted contains the rate of compliance
multiplied by the assumed vaccine effectiveness.
In cases requiring two doses of vaccine to
satisfactorily protect against influenza-related
illness and death, a person was considered
compliant only after both doses.
Net Returns of Vaccination: Sensitivity
Analyses
To illustrate the importance of the death rate
in determining economic outcomes, we conducted
further sensitivity analyses in which the death
rates for persons not at high risk were one quarter
or half of those used in the main analyses (Table 2).
Insurance Premiums
To determine how much should be spent
each year to plan, prepare, and practice to ensure
that mass vaccinations can take place if needed,
we considered the funding of those activities as
an annual insurance premium (32). The
premium would be used to pay for improving
surveillance systems, ensuring sufficient supply
of vaccine for high-priority groups (and possibly
the entire U.S. population), conducting research
to improve detection of new influenza subtypes,
and developing emergency preparedness plans
to ensure adequate medical care and mainte-
nance of essential community services (32). We
calculated the premium as follows (33): annual
insurance premium = net returns from an
intervention x the annual probability of a
pandemic.
Table 4. Cost of vaccinationa during an influenza pandemic, with
specific costs assigned to side effects of vaccination
Cost Lower- Upper-
of case cost cost
Probability of side scenario scenario
of effect ($/ ($/
Item effectb ($)b patient) patient)
Assumed cost    18    59
  of vaccinationa
  (excluding side
  effects)
Side effects
  Mildc 0.0325         94   3.05   3.05
  GBSd 0.000002 100,800   0.20   0.20
  Anaphylaxis 0.000000157     2,490   0.01   0.01
Total cost per 21.26 62.26
  patient
aThe cost of vaccination includes the cost of the vaccine, the
cost of administering the vaccine, value of time spent by a
person traveling to and from the place of vaccination, and
patient-associated travel costs. Included in the costs of the
vaccine are any costs associated with the rapid production of
a larger-than-usual number of doses and the rapid delivery
and correct storage of doses at vaccination sites around the
country. For $18, the costs were assumed to be $10 for vaccine
+ administration, $4 patient time (half hour), $4 patient
travel costs. For $59, the costs were assumed to be $20 for
vaccine + administration (this could include the cost of two
doses), $32 patient time (two trips at 2 hours per trip), and $7
patient travel costs. For comparison, a review of 10 published
articles found a range of $5 to $22 per dose of vaccine, with a
medium [sic] cost of $14 per dose (10). Additional details are
provided in the background paper (see Appendix II). These
breakdowns are illustrations only of what might be deemed
reasonable estimates of time and cost. Actual costs might vary
substantially and will depend on the number of doses needed
to achieve a satisfactory protective response, as well as the
efficiency of giving vaccinations to millions of persons.
bProbabilities and average cost of treating each category of
side effect were derived from (3).
cMild side effects include sore arms due to vaccination,
headaches, and other minor side effects that may require a
visit to a physician or may cause the patient to miss 1 to 2 days
of work.
dGBS = Guillain Barré syndrome.664 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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Vaccination Priorities and Distribution
During the early stages of a pandemic, the
supply of influenza vaccine will likely be limited.
Even if sufficient vaccine is produced to
vaccinate the entire U.S. population, it will take
time to administer the vaccine to all, especially if
two doses are required. Because a pandemic will
be caused by a new subtype of influenza, two
doses of vaccine may be required. Who should
receive priority for vaccination until vaccine
supplies are more plentiful? To illustrate the use
of the model in estimating the impact of different
priorities, we created sample priority lists by
using three different criteria: total deaths, risk
for death, and maximizing net returns due to
vaccination. In choosing the criteria for
priorities, society must debate the main goal of a
pandemic vaccination plan: prevent deaths,
regardless of age and position in society; prevent
deaths among those at greatest risk (i.e.,  65
years of age); or minimize the social disruption. If
the last is the goal of society, the net return due
to vaccination should be used to set priorities.
The model can also be used to compare the
economic consequences of plans that specify
which target populations are vaccinated. To
illustrate this capability, we constructed four
options for prioritizing vaccine distribution. For
Option A, the target population is similar to
current Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) recommendations, with pro-
duction and use of vaccine similar to current,
intrapandemic recommendations (17). We as-
sumed 77.4 million vaccinees.4 Option B targets
the number of vaccinees as outlined in Option A
plus approximately 20 million essential service
providers (5 million health-care workers and 15
million providers of other service) (99.2 million
vaccinees). Option C aims to achieve a 40%
effective coverage of the entire U.S. population
(106.1 million vaccinees), and Option D, 60%
effective coverage of the entire U.S. population
(159.2 million vaccinees).
The number of vaccine doses required to
meet each option will depend on the number of
doses per person needed to obtain an immune
response. If two are needed, lack of compliance
with a two-dose regimen will mean that the
actual number of doses needed will be higher
than double the target population for each option
(i.e., >40% or >60% of the population will have to
receive the first dose to ensure that 40% or 60%
are fully vaccinated). If two doses are required,
the cost per person vaccinated will increase
(Table 4).
Findings
Illnesses and Deaths
The number of hospitalizations due to an
influenza epidemic ranged from approximately
314,000 (5th percentile = 210,000; 95th percentile
= 417,000) at a gross attack rate of 15% to
approximately 734,000 (5th percentile = 441,000;
95th percentile = 973,000) at a gross attack rate
of 35% (Figure 1). The mean numbers of persons
requiring outpatient-based care ranged from
approximately 18 million (gross attack rate of
15%) to 42 million (gross attack rate of 35%)
(Figure 1). The mean numbers of those clinically
ill not seeking medical care but still sustaining
economic loss ranged from approximately 20
million (gross attack rate of 15%) to 47 million
(gross attack rate of 35%) (Figure 1). The
estimated number of deaths ranged from
approximately 89,000 (5th percentile = 55,000;
95th percentile = 122,000) at a gross attack rate
of 15%, which increased to approximately 207,000
deaths (5th percentile = 127,000; 95th percentile
= 285,000) at a gross attack rate of 35% (Figure 1).
Groups at high risk (approximately 15% of
the total U.S. population) (Table 1) would likely
be disproportionately affected by an influenza
pandemic. These groups accounted for approxi-
mately 85% of all deaths, with groups at high risk
in the 20- to 64-year-old age group accounting for
approximately 41% of total deaths (Table 5).
Groups at high risk also accounted for 38% of all
hospitalizations and 20% of all outpatient visits
(Table 5).
Economic Impact of an Influenza Pandemic
Without large-scale immunization, the
estimates of the total economic impact in the
United States of an influenza pandemic ranged
from $71.3 billion (5th percentile = $35.4 billion;
95th percentile = $107.0 billion) (gross attack
rate of 15%) to $166.5 billion (5th percentile =
$82.6 billion; 95th percentile = $249.6 billion)
(gross attack rate of 35%) (Table 6). At any given
attack rate, loss of life accounted for approxi-
mately 83% of all economic losses. Outpatients,
persons ill but not seeking medical care, and
inpatients accounted for approximately 8%, 6%,
and 3%, respectively, of all economic losses
(Table 6) (Appendix II).665 Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure 1: Impact of influenza pandemic in the United States: mean, minimum, maximum, and 5th and 95th
percentiles of total death, hospitalizations, outpatients, and those ill (but not seeking medical care) for different
gross attack rates. Note that for each gross attack rate, data are totals for all age groups and risk categories.
Net Value of Vaccination
If it cost $21 to vaccinate a person and the
effective coverage were 40%, net savings to
society would result from vaccinating all age and
risk groups (Figure 2). However, vaccinating
certain age and risk groups rather than others
would produce higher net returns. For example,
vaccinating patients ages 20 to 64 years of age
not at high risk would produce higher net
returns than vaccinating patients ages 65 years
of age and older who are at high risk (Figure 2).
At a cost of $62 per vaccinee and gross attack
rates of less than 25%, vaccinating populations
at high risk would still generate positive returns
(Figure 2). However, vaccinating populations not
at high risk would result in a net loss (Figure 2).
Table 5. Impact, by age group, death, hospitalizations,
and outpatients accounted for by groups at high risk
during an influenza pandemica
Age Total cases
group at high risk (%)
Category (yrs) Mean 5th 95th
Death   0-19   9.0   1.4 20.2
20-64 40.9 11.1 60.9
65 + 34.4 22.7 52.1
Total 84.3
Hospitalizations   0-19   4.6   2.1   7.9
20-64 14.7   7.4 23.4
65 + 18.3 11.0 27.6
Total 37.6
Outpatients   0-19   5.0   4.7   5.4
20-64 10.4   9.8 11.0
65 +   4.0   3.9   4.2
Total 19.5
aSee Table 1 for distribution of groups at high and not at high
risk within the U.S. population.666 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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Sensitivity Analyses
At a vaccination cost of $21.26 per vaccinee,
reducing the death rates to half and one quarter
of the initial values (Table 2) left positive mean
net returns for all age groups not at high risk.
However, at a vaccination cost of $62.26 per
vaccinee, reducing death rates to half and one
quarter of the initial values resulted in negative
mean net returns for all age groups not at high
risk. The results are much less sensitive to
increases in gross attack rate than to increases in
death rate. For example, assuming a cost of
$62.26 per vaccinee and death rates that are half
the initial rates, increasing the gross attack rate
from 15% to 25% still resulted in negative net
returns for all age groups, regardless of assumed
level of vaccine effectiveness.
Implications for Policy
The amount of the insurance premium to
spend on planning, preparedness, and practice
for responding to the next influenza pandemic
ranged from $48 million to $2,184 million per
year (Table 7). The amount was sensitive to the
probability of the pandemic, the cost of
vaccinating a person, and the gross attack rate.
Because higher costs of vaccination reduce net
returns from an intervention, increased vaccina-
tion costs reduced the premiums. Conversely,
increases in gross attack rates (all other inputs
held constant) increased the potential returns
from an intervention and thus the amount of
premiums.
When risk for death is used as the criterion
for who will be vaccinated first, persons ages 65
years and older receive top priority (Table 8);
however, when mean net returns due to
vaccination are used as the criterion, that group
receives the lowest priority (Table 8). Regardless
of criteria used, persons at high risk ages 0 to 19
and 20 to 64 years would always receive priority
over persons not at high risk from the same age
groups (Table 8).
While Option A would ensure positive mean
net returns, Option B would result in greater
mean net returns (Figure 3). Changing the
strategy from vaccinating specific groups
(Option B) to vaccinating 40% of the population
decreased mean net returns (Figure 3). Only
Option D resulted in higher mean net returns
Table 6. Costs (direct and indirect) of influenza pandemic per gross attack rate:a deaths, hospitalizations, outpatients,
illnesses, and total costs (in 1995 US$)
Cost per gross attack rate ($ millions)
15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Deaths
  Mean   59,288   79,051   98,814 118,577 138,340
    5th percentile     23,800     31,733     39,666     47,599     55,532
    95th percentile      94,907   126,543   158,179   189,815   221,451
Hospitalizations
  Mean     1,928     2,571     3,214     3,856     4,499
    5th percentile       1,250       1,667       2,084       2,501       2,917
    95th percentile       2,683       3,579       4,472       5,367       6,261
Outpatients
  Mean     5,708     7,611     9,513   11,416   13,318
    5th percentile       4,871       6,495       8,119       9,742     11,366
    95th percentile       6,557       8,742     10,928     13,113     15,299
Ill, no medical care soughtb
  Mean     4,422     5,896     7,370     8,844   10,317
    5th percentile       3,270       4,360       5,450       6,540       7,629
    95th percentile       5,557       7,409       9,262     11,114     12,967
Grand totals
  Mean   71,346   95,128 118,910 142,692 166,474
    5th percentile     35,405     47,206     59,008     70,810     82,611
    95th percentile   106,988   142,650   178,313   213,975   249,638
aGross attack rate = percentage of clinical influenza illness per population.
bPersons who become clinically ill due to influenza but do not seek medical care; illness has an economic impact (e.g., half day
off work).667 Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure 2: Mean net returns due to vaccination, by age group, for different gross attack rates and percentages
of compliance. Case-age distributions are given in Table 1. Assumed vaccine effectiveness is the same as the
high vaccine effectiveness defined in Appendix I.
Table 7. The mean annual insurance premiuma for planning, preparing, and practicing to respond to the next influenza
pandemic
Mean (s.d.) insurance premium ($ millions)
Low vaccine effectivenessb High vaccine effectivenessb
Cost of x 40% compliance x 60% compliance
Gross vaccination Probability of pandemic Probability of pandemic
attack per 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in 1 in
rate vaccinee($) 30 years 60 years 100 years 30 years 60 years 100 years
15% 21 306 (122) 153   (61)   92 (37)    872 (341)    435 (170) 262 (103)
62 162 (122)   81   (61)   48 (37)    654 (341)    326 (170) 196 (103)
25% 21 561 (204) 280 (102) 168 (61) 1,528 (569)    762 (284) 459 (171)
62 416 (204) 207 (102) 125 (61) 1,311 (569)    653 (284) 394 (171)
35% 21 815 (286) 406 (142) 245 (86) 2,184 (796) 1,089 (397) 656 (239)
62 670 (286) 334 (142) 201 (86) 1,967 (796)    980 (397) 591 (239)
aDefined here as the amount of money to be spent each year to plan, prepare, and practice to ensure that such mass vaccinations
can take place if needed. See text for description of calculating premiums. The mathematically optimal allocation of such funds
for each activity requires a separate set of calculations.
bLow and high levels of vaccine effectiveness are defined in Appendix I.668 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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than Option B. Note, however, that the 5th and
95th percentiles for each option overlapped with
those of other options. Thus, the differences in
mean values between the options may not occur
in practice.
Conclusions
Impact of an Influenza Pandemic
Although the next influenza pandemic in the
United States may cause considerable illness
Table 8. Setting vaccination priorities: Which age group or group at risk should be vaccinated first?
Criteria for prioritization
Priority Risk for deatha Total deathsb Returns due to vaccination
1 (top) High risk 65 + yrs High risk 20 - 64 yrs High risk 20 - 64 yrs
2 Not at high risk 65 + yrs High risk 65 + yrs High risk 0 - 19 yrs
3 High risk 0 - 19 yrs High risk 0 - 19 yrs Not at high risk 20 - 64 yrs
4 High risk 20 - 64 yrs Not at high risk, 65 + yrs Not at high risk 0 - 19 yrs
5 Not at high risk 20 - 64 yrs Not at high risk 20 - 64 yrs High risk 65 + yrs
6 (bottom) Not at high risk 0 - 19 yrs Not at high risk 0 - 19 yrs Not at high risk 65 + yrs
aPriorities set by risk for death are set according to lower-limit estimates of deaths per 1,000 population for each age and risk
group.
bThe priority list using the total deaths criteria was set by examining the percentage of total deaths that each age and risk group
contributed to the total deaths estimated due to a pandemic. The group with the highest percentage (i.e, contributes the largest
number of deaths) is listed as having the highest priority.
Figure 3: Four options for responding to an influenza pandemic: mean net economic returns. Notes: a) Bars show
mean net returns for each option and assumed cost of vaccination. b) Option A: Similar to current Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations, with production and use similar to current, intra-
pandemic recommendations (17). Assumed approximately 77 million vaccinees. Option B: Number of vaccinees
as outlined in Scenario A plus 20 million essential service providers (5 million health-care workers + 15 million
other service providers). Option C: Aim to achieve a 40% coverage of total U.S. population. Option D: Aim to
achieve 60% coverage of total U.S. population (Appendix II).669 Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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and death (Figure 1), great uncertainty is
associated with any estimate of the pandemics
potential impact. While the results can describe
potential impact at gross attack rates from 15%
to 35%, no existing data can predict the
probability of any of those attack rates actually
occurring. In addition, the groups at high risk
are likely to incur a disproportionate number
of deaths (Table 5); 50% or more of the deaths
will likely occur among persons age 65 years
and older (Appendix II), a distribution also
found in the influenza pandemics of 1918,
1957, and 1968 (2).
Our results illustrate that the greatest
economic cost is due to death (Table 6).
Therefore, all other things being equal, the
largest economic returns will come from the
intervention(s) that prevents the largest number
of deaths. A limitation of the model is that,
beyond the value of a lost day of work (Table 3),
the model does not include any valuation for
disruptions in commerce and society. For
example, if many long-distance truck drivers
were unavailable to drive for 1 or 2 weeks, there
might be disruptions in the distribution of
perishable items, especially food. These multi-
plier effects are not accounted for in this model,
mainly because an estimate of an appropriate
multiplier will depend on who becomes ill, how
many become ill, when they become ill, and for
how long they are ill.
All other factors being held constant, the net
returns due to vaccination are sensitive to the
combination of price and gross attack rate, with
some scenarios generating negative mean
returns (Figure 2). Further, some scenarios with
a positive mean net return had a negative 5th
percentile (Appendix II). The fact that negative
results can be generated should serve as a
warning that many interventions may not
guarantee a net positive economic return.
Implications for Policy
The premium that could be spent each year
for influenza pandemic response (planning,
preparedness, and practice) depends most on the
assumed probability of the pandemic (Table 7).
The wide range in premiums presents a
cautionary tale of the difference between
possibility and probability of an influenza
pandemic. What cannot be stated with any
certainty are the probability of a pandemic and
the number of persons who will become ill and
die. Deciding the difference between possibility
and probability was a key decision point in the
swine flu incident of 1976-77 (34).
Vaccination priorities depend on the objec-
tives. If preventing the greatest number of
deaths is the most important goal, society should
ensure that those in the groups at high risk
become vaccinated first, followed by those age 65
years or older who have no preexisting medical
conditions making them more susceptible to
complications from influenza (Table 8). How-
ever, if maximizing economic returns is the
highest priority, persons 0 to 64 years of age,
regardless of risk, should be vaccinated first
(Table 8). Results also illustrate the need to be
precise in defining the criterion used for setting
priorities. For example, stating that prevent-
ing death will be the criteria used is not
sufficiently precise because different priority
lists can be drawn up using death rates versus
total deaths (Table 8).
The criteria used to generate the results in
Table 8 do not define the entire set of possible
methods of setting priorities. Society may decide
to use another criterion or set of criteria.
Priorities for vaccination may also depend on the
epidemiology of the pandemic. For example, if
the strain causing the pandemic were particu-
larly virulent among those ages 20 to 40 years,
that age group may receive highest priority.
Since the epidemiology of the next pandemic is
unknown, any plan must allow flexibility in
determining criteria for setting priorities. Table
8 provides a starting point for debate regarding
who should be vaccinated first.
The net returns for the four scenarios
modeled (Figure 3) further illustrate the need to
clearly set criteria, goals, and objectives for a
vaccine-based intervention for the next influ-
enza pandemic. Some may state that Options C
and D represent a more egalitarian means of
distributing vaccine. However, egalitarianism
would cost society more since the mean net
returns from Options C are lower than those
from Option B (Figure 3). Option D produces
higher returns than Option B (Figure 3), but
vaccinating 60% of the U.S. population in a short
time would be difficult, especially if two doses of
vaccine are required. If two doses were required,
Option D would mean producing, delivering, and
administering approximately 320 million doses
of vaccine in a 2- to 3-month period, which has
never been accomplished in the United States.670 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1999
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Savings from outcomes averted        =         å (Number with outcome before intervention
         age,                  Outcomes death,       age,
             risk hospitalization,        risk
             group outpatient, ill,        group
no medical care
x  compliance x  vaccine effectiveness x   $value of outcome         prevented)
         age,            Outcomes          death,
             risk           hospitalization,
             group           outpatient, ill,
          no medical care
and;
Cost of vaccination =     $cost/vaccinee x population x  compliance
    age,              age              age,
      risk               risk               risk
      group              group              group
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